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Abstract
We investigate the potential relationship between female combatants and conflict duration. We
contend that recruiting female combatants extends war duration via its influence on state–rebel
bargaining. The recruitment and deployment of female combatants contribute to divergent per-
spectives between the rebels and the incumbent regarding the rebel group’s capabilities and the
depth of its resolve, which impedes successful bargaining and extends the duration of the conflict.
Results from duration analyses using data on the estimated prevalence of female combatants in
rebel groups active between 1964 and 2011 support our central hypothesis and suggest that the
use of female fighters is associated with longer conflicts.
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By the early 1980s, the survival of the Farabundo Martı́ National Liberation Movement
(FMLN) appeared tenuous. The rapidly escalating conflict produced extremely high mortal-
ity rates among the guerrilla forces, resulting in severe personnel shortages. These acute
resource pressures, coupled with the group’s broadly egalitarian ethos and Marxist ideology,
incentivized the FMLN’s leadership to expand women’s roles in the rebellion and further
encourage female recruitment. In response, thousands of Salvadoran women left their vil-
lages and returned from refugee camps to ‘‘bend gender’’ and take up arms with the rebel
movement (Viterna, 2013: 64). Joining the rebellion dramatically altered the identities of
many female recruits, from mother, daughter, and caregiver to guerrilla fighter. This transi-
tion came at great personal cost for many women as they abandoned traditional home and
family life—and sometimes their own children—to help advance the FMLN’s revolutionary
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goals. The large number of female recruits, which ultimately composed roughly a third of
the group’s combat force, also had an indelible influence on the movement: they provided
organizational stability and cohesion and were essential to the FMLN’s ability to ‘‘maintain
a large and committed rebel army over the twelve years of conflict’’ (Viterna, 2013: 220).
Female combatants had a similar impact on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s
(LTTE). The combination of a permissive gender ideology and acute resource pressures con-
tributed to the large-scale recruitment of female combatants (Alison, 2003; Samarasinghe,
1996). As with the guerrilleras of the FMLN, female Tamil Tigers faced substantial costs for
transgressing the gender norms of their traditional society (Friedman, 2018). Moreover, the
mobilization of large numbers of women generated tensions with the Tamil community and
threatened to undermine the group’s legitimacy among the population (Terpstra and Frerks,
2017). Despite the potential costs associated with this decision, female combatants repre-
sented a significant source of recruits for the LTTE throughout the war. Thousands of
Tamil women took up arms during the two-decade independence struggle, representing a
fifth of the group’s guerrilla fighters (Alison, 2003; Stack-O’Conner, 2007).
These examples illustrate several important features of rebel efforts to mobilize women
for war. First, female fighters play important roles in many armed rebellions, and their
recruitment can bolster the group’s overall capabilities by substantially increasing the num-
ber of troops it can deploy against the incumbent. Yet, mobilizing women for war can also
generate significant costs, potentially creating tensions with the local population and forcing
female recruits to abandon their traditional roles in society. These observations raise impor-
tant questions regarding the repercussions of female recruitment and its broader strategic
implications. Despite rising scholarly interest in identifying and explaining patterns of
women’s participation in armed conflict, few cross-national studies have investigated the
potential influence that armed group gender composition and gendered recruitment strate-
gies might have on conflict dynamics, group behaviors, or war outcomes. To our knowledge,
a recent study by Braithwaite and Ruiz (2018), which finds that incumbents are less likely to
defeat rebel groups that include female fighters, represents the only existing research that
explicitly examines these relationships.
We seek to address this gap in the literature. Borrowing insights from the bargaining
model of war, we develop a theoretically grounded perspective on the potential relationship
between female combatants and conflict duration. We contend that the presence of female
combatants, particularly in large numbers, extends war duration through its influence on
state–rebel bargaining. Specifically, the decision to recruit and deploy female combatants
contributes to divergent perspectives between the rebels and the governments regarding the
rebel group’s capabilities and the depth of its resolve. While the incumbent may observe the
presence of female fighters among the rebels, their aggregate contribution to the group’s
fighting capacity and their relationship to group resolve represent private information that
is only (partially) revealed as the conflict unfolds. Government uncertainty regarding the
meaning and impact of female recruitment impedes successful bargaining, thereby extending
the duration of the conflict.
We assess the empirical validity of our arguments using data from the Women in Armed
Rebellion Dataset (WARD), which provides information on the prevalence of female com-
batants for a global sample of contemporary rebel organizations. Results from a series of
survival models support our central argument. Even after accounting for confounding fac-
tors commonly associated with conflict duration and addressing multiple possible sources of
potential bias, we find that a higher prevalence of female fighters is strongly correlated with
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the duration of the conflict. In other words, rebel groups that include a higher proportion of
female combatants tend to fight longer wars than those that exclude them.
The manuscript proceeds as follows. We first briefly summarize the bargaining model of
war, devoting particular attention to the manner in which the resolve of the weaker party
and uncertainty over its capabilities can hinder bargaining in asymmetric conflicts. We then
discuss how recruiting female fighters, which often occurs during periods of intense rebel
resource demands, exacerbates uncertainty and contributes to divergence in the actors’
beliefs about the distribution of capabilities and rebel resolve, thus impeding bargaining and
extending the duration of the conflict. Next, we describe our research design and present our
results. In order to contextualize these findings and further illuminate the proposed mechan-
isms, we then present a brief sketch of female recruitment by the LTTE and its implications.
We conclude by discussing the academic and policy relevance of these findings and suggest a
number of potentially fruitful avenues for future research.
Bargaining and war duration
The stylized model of the bargaining process involving rebels and the incumbent regime rou-
tinely assumes that the two sides engage in an iterative process of demands made by the for-
mer (for resource redistribution, electoral reform, regime change, etc.) and a decision by the
latter to either refuse or concede to those demands (e.g. Powell, 2003; Slantchev, 2003).
Where the incumbent acquiesces to the challengers’ demands, the conflict ends; where the it
refuses, the conflict persists. Scholars often further assume that both the scope and scale of
the demands made by the rebels, as well as the decision by the incumbent to acquiesce to
those demands, are informed by each actor’s perceptions of the relative distribution of power
between them, their own willingness to endure the costs of ongoing violence and their beliefs
about their adversary’s ability to absorb costs (e.g. Sullivan, 2007; Walter, 2009).
When these factors are observable and mutually agreed by the parties, bargaining is more
efficient than (ongoing) warfare. More militarily capable rebels that can credibly threaten to
impose higher costs on the incumbent are able to make substantial demands that are com-
mensurate with their strength, and the incumbent is more likely to concede. For these rea-
sons, stronger rebellions tend to fight shorter wars and achieve more of their war aims
(Clayton, 2013; Cunningham et al., 2009). Previous studies also highlight the influence of
actors’ cost tolerance on bargaining. In particular, superior resolve can allow the weaker
party in an asymmetric conflict to achieve concessions that exceed those predicted solely by
the relative distribution of power between actors (e.g. Mack, 1975; Sullivan, 2007; Walter,
2009: 252). Problematically, both capabilities and resolve often represent information that is
privately held or intentionally obscured by the actors involved—conditions that impede suc-
cessful bargaining and thus contribute to longer wars (Bapat, 2005; Powell, 2002).
Fighting partially reveals privately held information, potentially improving the odds of
successful bargaining (e.g. Filson and Werner, 2002; Powell, 2003). However, challenger
demands and target willingness to concede are endogenous to the conflict environment, and
actors tend to increase their demands as their perceived odds of victory improve (e.g. Filson
and Werner, 2002). This feature of war contributes to bargaining failure and extends the
duration of conflict. For example, Bapat (2005) contends that if rebel groups survive beyond
their initial period of weakness, they may reject later government concessions that accurately
reflect the distribution of capabilities in favor of a strategy of complete victory, thus
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producing a protracted conflict. Additionally, the ‘‘noisy and imprecise’’ nature of battlefield
learning often fails to negate the challenges associated with asymmetric information and
uncertainty (Slantchev, 2003: 628). Thus, incumbents often remain uncertain about the rebel
capabilities and resolve even after repeated battlefield encounters.
The complex and fluid nature of civil wars, in which armed groups fragment and unite,
foreign powers intervene, and resources rapidly shift, further exacerbates information asym-
metries and impedes the convergence of beliefs about the actors’ utility for war relative to
settlement. Previous studies illustrate how such group- or conflict-level characteristics can
obscure information and promote divergent beliefs. For example, rebel access to foreign ter-
ritories impedes the ability of governments to attain reliable information about the group’s
capabilities, thus resulting in longer wars (Salehyan, 2007). Similarly, the provisions of cer-
tain types of external support to rebels can undermine bargaining and prolong violence by
exacerbating government uncertainty about their effect on the balance of power in the con-
flict (Sawyer et al., 2017). These insights lead us to consider the potential role that rebel
recruitment strategies—in particular, the recruitment of female combatants—play in deter-
mining the duration of the conflict.
Female recruitment as a source of uncertainty
As the previous section highlights, uncertainty often impedes successful bargaining and
extends the duration of war. In this section, we propose that female recruitment serves as an
additional source of uncertainty that complicates rebel–state bargaining. This uncertainty
stems from the combination of informational deficits about the contributions that female
combatants make to an armed groups’ capabilities, military leaders’ skepticism about
women’s combat competence and their effects on group cohesion and preparedness, and
failure on the part of the incumbent to interpret female recruitment as a signal of rebel
resolve. While both sides are initially unsure of the contributions female fighters make to
rebel capabilities, rebel leaders update their beliefs more rapidly and more accurately than
their government counterparts because they directly observe the fighters that they recruit.
While governments observe female recruitment, the effectiveness of female fighters and their
ability to augment rebel capabilities is only (partially) revealed over time through repeated
battlefield interactions. Similarly, rebels are acutely aware of the costs associated with female
recruitment and have priced these into their decision to mobilize women for war. However,
these costs represent private information that the government is typically unable to observe,
leading it to underappreciate the signal of (group and individual) resolve that female recruit-
ment represents. The divergent beliefs that governments and rebels hold over these factors
impede successful bargaining and may ultimately extend the duration of the conflict.
Rebel capabilities
Capabilities are a critical determinant of both the length and the outcome of civil conflicts.
More capable armed groups are less likely to suffer defeat and more likely to achieve their
goals (e.g. Cunningham et al., 2009). Similarly, groups that mobilize substantial numbers of
recruits and rapidly replenish their forces after losses are better able to mount an effective
resistance against the regime’s forces and to sustain themselves over a longer period of time.
For these reasons, rebel leaders typically seek to maximize the number of acceptable troops
under their command. Able-bodied adult males are the preferred recruits for most rebel
4 Conflict Management and Peace Science 00(0)
groups (and state militaries) (Goldstein, 2001).1 However, during periods of intense fighting
the demand for these recruits can rapidly outstrip their supply, particularly where extended
periods of violence and repression have led to the displacement, death, or detention of large
numbers of younger males. The combination of rising resource pressures and constraints on
the supply of preferred recruits encourages the leadership of some rebel organizations to
recruit among the female population and to expand women’s roles within the organization,
including deploying them in combat roles (Alison, 2003: 39; Stack-O’Connor, 2007: 47;
Wood, 2019).2
The relatively low rate of female recruitment among non-state armed groups suggests that
rebel leaders seldom view women as optimal combatants.3 Nonetheless, female fighters con-
stitute a substantial proportion of the combat forces of a subset of effective and highly resili-
ent rebel movements. In addition to the examples provided in the introduction, women
accounted for at least a fifth of the fighters in the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front in
Ethiopia, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party in Turkey, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia and the Mujahedin-e-Khalq in Iran.4 For each of these movements, incorporating
women contributed thousands of additional troops to the group’s overall fighting force.
Prior studies further suggest that female fighters can confer substantial strategic benefits on
the groups that recruit them. At minimum, the decision to recruit women widens the pool of
potential combatants available to a rebel group, allowing it to field more troops than it oth-
erwise would and facilitating its ability to replace troops injured or killed in combat. Wood
(2019: 170–171), for example, finds that the estimated troop size is larger for groups that
include female combatants than for those that exclude them. Similarly, Israelsen (2020: 128)
suggests that recruiting women provides short-term infusions of resources that allow rebels
to achieve strategic goals. Given the highly asymmetric nature of civil conflicts, the addi-
tional resources resulting from female recruitment—possibly hundreds or thousands of
fighters—should also increase the group’s ability to mount an effective challenge to the
incumbent regime. It is arguably for this reason that incumbents are less likely to defeat
rebel movements that (voluntarily) recruit female combatants (Braithwaite and Ruiz, 2018).
The tactical and strategic benefits of female fighters extend beyond the additional troop
numbers that their recruitment provides. The FMLN, for example, identified early on that
women ‘‘brought skills and knowledge to the war effort that men simply did not have’’
(Viterna, 2013: 67). Likewise, leaders of the LTTE explicitly acknowledged the tactical
advantages and improved ethos female combatants brought to their group (Stack-
O’Connor, 2007: 44). Gender norms that assume women’s peacefulness and passivity may
also make it easier for female combatants to successfully conduct lethal clandestine opera-
tions (O’Rourke, 2009; Thomas, 2021). The presence of female fighters may also indirectly
influence rebel capabilities. Evidence from a diverse array of cases suggests that female com-
batants are highly effective as recruiters because they both generate sympathy among local
populations and shame reluctant males into joining the rebellion (e.g. Weiss, 1986: 80;
Viterna, 2013). Women in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), for example, acted
as ‘‘organizational brokers’’ who brought in new recruits through ‘‘quotidian networks,’’
which enabled the PLO to adapt and persevere following ‘‘extreme disruption’’ (Parkinson,
2013: 424). Similarly, several studies demonstrate that rebel efforts to highlight women’s
contributions to the movement can help rebels solicit sympathy and support from domestic
as well as international audiences (Loken, 2021; Manekin and Wood, 2020). Although the
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) began recruiting female combatants in
response to massive losses of male soldiers, the group exaggerated women’s participation as
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part of a strategy to win support from the local populations (Mudeka, 2014: 89; O’Gorman,
2011). The presence of female fighters may therefore positively influence resource mobiliza-
tion more broadly, thus reflecting an additional avenue through which female combatants
enhance group capabilities.
Problematically, rebels and the incumbent are likely to disagree about the expected con-
tributions of female combatants to the group’s capabilities. Military leaders and policy-
makers (both predominantly male) often contend that women are ill-suited for the rigors of
war and make poor soldiers (e.g. Goldstein, 2001: 101; MacKenzie, 2015)—a factor that
they use to justify women’s exclusion from combat. The pervasive gender biases that leaders
hold may therefore distort the government’s perception of the relationship between female
recruitment and rebel capabilities. For instance, US Defense Secretary James Mattis has
expressed that he is unsure whether the inclusion of women in combat roles represents ‘‘a
strength or a weakness’’ (Mattis, 2018). Such attitudes, coupled with the timing of female
recruitment, which often occurs during periods of relative strategic disadvantage for the
rebels, are likely to convince governments that the decision to mobilize women is borne of
rebel weakness. The incumbent may therefore misjudge the potential military contributions
of female fighters and underestimate the utility of female recruitment as a strategy for alle-
viating acute resource demands. The perception that female fighters signal desperation, com-
bined with a belief in women’s inferiority as combatants, therefore encourages incumbents
to revise downward their perceptions of rebel strength and thus their expectations of rebel
victory. This perception should subsequently reduce the concessions that the incumbent is
willing to offer the rebels to terminate the conflict.
For their part, rebels adopt a more sanguine view of the implications of female recruit-
ment. Once rebel leaders open recruitment opportunities to women, they have already priced
in the costs associated with this strategy. Mobilizing women represents a gamble for rebel
movements; yet implementing this strategy implies a belief among the rebel leadership that
training, arming, and deploying women in combat represents a reasonable (if not ideal)
means of addressing human resource shortfalls and bolstering the group’s capabilities. To
the extent that expanding opportunities for women represents an effective strategy of group
preservation and a means of augmenting group capabilities, rebel groups that recruit women
are likely to maintain (or possibly revise upward) their expectations of longer-term survival
and victory. As rebel and government beliefs regarding the effects of female combatants on
rebel capabilities increasingly diverge, the prospects for bargaining success decline, thus
extending the conflict.
Commitment and resolve
Strength of resolve is often viewed as another important determinant of conflict duration,
particularly in the context of asymmetric conflicts (e.g. Mack, 1975). As we argue here, the
presence of female combatants is indicative of rebel resolve and therefore represents a
costly—although unintentional—signal of a group’s willingness to endure high costs in pur-
suit of its goals. For the organization, the costs associated with female recruitment include
threats to group cohesion, public backlash, and the potential for delegitimation. For individ-
ual female members, these costs include intense gender-specific personal sacrifices as well as
the potential for alienation from their families and communities. While rebels directly
observe or experience these costs, they are less obvious to the incumbent. Consequently,
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incumbents are likely to overlook or misunderstand the meaning of female recruitment, thus
contributing to divergent beliefs about the depth of rebel resolve and impeding bargaining.
Even faced with rising resource demands and internal pressure from female members,
rebel leaders remain wary of the potential consequences of arming and deploying women in
combat roles (Gayer, 2012; Wood, 2019: 38–39). The same gendered attitudes that shape
leaders’ beliefs about the appropriateness of deploying women in combat generate concerns
over the organizational implications of introducing women into the hyper-masculinized cul-
ture that pervades military organizations. In particular, leaders fear that opening combat
roles to women will adversely impact group cohesion, preparedness, and combat effective-
ness (e.g. Goldstein, 2001: 183, 203; MacKenzie, 2015; Ministry of Defense, 2010). Such
fears are largely unsupported by existing data (MacKenzie, 2015), including evidence from
the many successful guerrilla movements that have relied heavily on female fighters.
Nonetheless, the ubiquitously male leadership of armed groups tends to perceive incorporat-
ing women as a costly decision that risks undermining the group’s fighting capacity.
In addition to the (perceived) challenges that they potentially present to the group’s com-
bat capabilities, female fighters are often perceived as a threat to prevailing social hierarchies
(Elshtain, 1987). Rebel leaders therefore fear that training and arming women will provoke
social backlash and alienate important local constituencies, thus undercutting an important
source of rebel support (Wood, 2019: 40). For example, during the Zimbabwean Liberation
War, the leadership of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army which recruited
large numbers of female fighters, began to curtail or downplay women’s roles in the face of
complaints and criticisms from village chiefs and other local leaders (Kriger, 1992: 194–196).
Similarly, conservative Tamil families feared the social ramifications of the LTTE’s recruit-
ment of women and were ‘‘displeased’’ with the roles their daughters would take up
(Terpstra and Frerks, 2017: 299). For these reasons, rebel leaders often undertake legitima-
tion efforts intended to reassure local communities that women’s participation and the social
sacrifices embedded within it represent a deepened commitment to their political struggle
against the incumbent regime (Terpstra and Frerks, 2017). LTTE leaders attempted to quell
social backlash for recruiting female combatants by discursively presenting these women as
‘‘brave mothers,’’ and ‘‘virgin warriors,’’ thus highlighting traditional Tamil expectations of
women’s chastity and reproductive duties (Friedman, 2018: 637).
Given the potential costs associated with this decision and the anecdotal evidence that
leaders seldom arrive at it quickly or lightly, the recruitment of female fighters should be
viewed as a costly signal of the group’s commitment to achieve their war aims. In particular,
rebel groups that opt to recruit female fighters—especially in large numbers—reveal that
they are willing to risk social backlash and accept the costs associated with upsetting deeply
embedded social norms and hierarchies. To the extent that rebel leaders realize the potential
repercussions of mobilizing women for war, they signal a willingness to abandon the pre-
war status quo. Rebels that engage in large-scale female recruitment are therefore, in a sense,
committed to an all-or-nothing strategy. Given the frequently cited relationship between
resolve and conflict duration, to the extent that female fighters are indicative of group
resolve, their presence in large numbers is likely to be associated with longer, more pro-
tracted conflicts.
The costs associated with women’s participation in organized violence may also reflect the
commitment of the individual women who take up arms on behalf of the group. For all
members of rebel movements, participation represents a costly investment in the acquisition
of a particular set of socio-political goals through violent collective action. For many women,
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however, joining an armed movement often necessitates personal sacrifices that are both dif-
ferent from and more intense than those experienced by their male counterparts. The high
level of gender-specific costs that women experience is therefore likely to produce a positive
selection mechanism through which the most committed supporters of a cause respond to a
recruitment offer. In other words, gender-based differences in the costs of recruitment should
result in higher levels of commitment among female recruits compared with male recruits.
Gowrinathan (2017), for example, finds that although women’s individual reasons and
mechanisms for joining rebel movements may differ, these experiences are gendered and have
a powerful influence on levels of commitment. However, this selection mechanism is proba-
bly most evident in the subset of highly ideological movements that draw recruits primarily
from activist movements. It may also be less applicable when women join principally for
safety and self-preservation or where the group relies heavily on forcible recruitment.5
The unique costs that female fighters typically bear stem from the incompatibility of
women’s traditional roles within society and the duties and aspirations associated with their
membership in an armed resistance movement. Once women leave their communities to join
the rebellion, their new identity of guerrilla fighter supersedes their previously dominant
identities as homemakers and caregivers (Viterna, 2013: 54; see also Gayer, 2012; Veale,
2003). This radical identity transformation represents a challenge to the established social
order and often generates substantial social costs for the women who undertake it. In Nepal,
for example, female former Maoist rebels are perceived as social aberrations ‘‘because they
crossed the limits of a socially acceptable gender-based division of labour’’ (Dahal, 2015:
192). Similarly, female rebels in the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone were ‘‘far
removed from a submissive feminine ideal,’’ and they consequently risked social stigmatiza-
tion for their participation in violence (Cullen, 2020: 117). Female fighters in the Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda likewise felt marginalized, and many perceived that
they had few life options besides remaining the group (Hedlund, 2018: 124). The post-conflict
costs imposed on female fighters are likely highest for those who return to their communities
when the armed movement for which they fought suffers defeat. Particularly for the move-
ments most likely to recruit women, defeat implies the persistence (and in some cases) rein-
forcement of the pre-war social order. As such, the post-conflict fates of women who join
armed movements are intertwined with the success of the movement and its ability to chal-
lenge and revise the pre-war status quo.6
The identity transformation that comes with joining a rebel movement also represents a
form of personal sacrifice for many women. Female combatants often choose (or are forced)
to forgo motherhood out of commitment to the rebellion (Gayer, 2012; Veale, 2003). As a
former M-19 combatant explained: ‘‘Being in the guerilla group did not mean that you did
not want to be a mother.but the movement, the country, and the goal of changing society
were more important’’ (Florez-Morris, 2010: 225). Similarly, Viterna (2013: 166) contends
that most female guerrillas ‘‘sacrificed the identity of mother in order to stay active in the
FMLN,’’ representing a visible and costly signal of the female guerrillas’ deep commitment
to the movement. The costliness of this identity transformation is also evident in the back-
lash many women receive from their families and their communities. A female ex-combatant
for the PLA in Nepal recalled:
Being a girl holding guns and living with unknown people in the jungle was a big deal for my family
. I remember my grandmother was very much disturbed by my decision. She was convinced that
marriage is the only salvation for women. (Dahal, 2015: 189)
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As these accounts demonstrate, women who challenge gender norms and reject familial
expectations by joining an armed group often experience intense social costs and psychologi-
cal stress.
The observation that female combatants face particularly high costs for participation in
organized violence relative to their male counterparts also has specific implications for their
attitudes and behaviors once they take up arms. Principally, these costs create profound
incentives for female combatants to fight harder for the groups they join and to remain com-
mitted to the movement and its goals even as costs mount. In short, we argue that the costs
associated with participating in rebellion signal a particularly high level of commitment
among female combatants. Combined with the increased resolve of rebel groups who have
elected to incorporate female combatants, the individual commitment of the group’s fighters
incentivizes the armed group to persist in its campaign against the government, despite
mounting military costs.
Hypothesis
The discussion above suggests a link between the large-scale recruitment of female comba-
tants by a rebel movement and the duration of the conflict. We argued that the prevalence
of female combatants creates uncertainty and contributes to divergent rebel and state per-
ceptions of the rebel group’s capabilities and resolve. More specifically, rebels view the
recruitment of female combatants as a strategy of self-preservation that bolsters the group’s
capabilities and allows it endure the rising costs of war over a longer period of time.
Furthermore, the rebel leadership perceives female recruitment as a potentially costly deci-
sion that is indicative of the group’s (and its members’) commitment to achieving their polit-
ical and military objectives. The government, however, is typically more uncertain about the
influence of female fighters on rebel capabilities and resolve. Consequently, the divergence
between rebel and government beliefs about the association between female combatants and
rebel capabilities/resolve hinders the bargaining process and increases the duration of civil
wars.
In constructing this argument, we highlight multiple mechanisms connecting female com-
batants and war duration, including their effect on group capabilities as well as the group-
and individual-level costs associated with female recruitment. We view these mechanisms as
mutually reinforcing. However, we do not attempt to adjudicate among them; nor do we
assume that each must be simultaneously present in order to produce the observed outcome.
For example, the infusion of resources that occurs from female recruitment may be sufficient
to extend the lifespan of some groups; for other groups, particularly those that experience
less intense resource constraints or recruit relatively fewer female fighters, the level of resolve
indicated by their willingness to mobilize women may facilitate survival. Regardless of the
strengths of the specific mechanism, we generate the following testable hypothesis regarding
the relations between the prevalence of female combatants and the duration of the conflict:
H1: Rebel groups with a greater prevalence of female combatants fight longer wars
Empirical approach
We assess this hypothesis quantitatively using data on women’s participation in armed resis-
tance movements, which comes from the WARD (v.1.3; Wood and Thomas, 2017), and
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detailed information on the duration of armed conflict between relevant rebel–government
civil conflict dyads taken from the UCDP’s Dyadic Conflict Termination Dataset (v.2-2015;
Kreutz, 2010).7 Combining the variables in the WARD with the UCDP dataset yields a sam-
ple of 296 rebel groups (389 dyad-episodes) active in 75 countries between 1964 and 2011.
The data structure of the sample is a cross-section of dyad-episodes in which each distinct
episode of conflict between a state and rebel groups is represented as a single, independent
observation in the analysis. We structure the data in this way because the measures included
in the WARD are time invariant, and the indicators accounting for group-level characteris-
tics, which we take from the Non-State Actor (NSA) Dataset (Cunningham et al., 2013),
vary only across discrete conflict episodes rather than annually.
For our analysis, we rely on Cox Proportional Hazard models (CPH) using the time (in
days) between the recorded date that a conflict episode surpassed the 25-battle death thresh-
old required for inclusion in the UCDP dataset and the date of its termination as recorded
in that dataset. We select the semi-parametric CPH over other classes of duration model
because of its superior flexibility, such as necessitating fewer assumptions about the baseline
hazard.8 Conflict termination is defined as the date at which the level of violence in a rebel-
government dyad falls below the UCDP’s 25 yearly battle death threshold.9
Conflicts can terminate in various ways, including decisive defeat of one party, peace
agreement, or low activity. Following recent studies (e.g. Sawyer et al., 2017), we focus our
attention on the factors that contribute to the duration of conflict rather than attempting to
examine each type of conflict outcome. This is because successful bargaining is not exclu-
sively related to success during formal negotiations. Concessions made outside of the context
of formal negotiations can bring a conflict to an end; moreover, peace talks often entail
inter-related stages involving a wide range of actors that only formalize the end of the war
at some later date (Sawyer et al., 2017: 1184). Lastly, regardless of whether the conflict ter-
minates via a formal settlement or through another means, the persistence of violence at
each discrete time point reflects the actors’ willingness in that moment to continue fighting
rather than concede to their opponents’ demands. Consequently, longer wars inherently
reflect persistent bargaining failure. Nonetheless, we also evaluate the influence of female
recruitment on specific forms of conflict termination and provide those results in the Online
Appendix.
Data on the prevalence of female combatants come from the WARD. Female fighters are
defined as women employed in frontline combat operations, as suicide bombers, and in
armed auxiliary and civil defense forces. We rely on the variable Female Combatants, which
is a categorical indicator accounting for the estimated proportion of women constituting the
group’s combat force.10 Table 1 describes each category of the variable.
Table 1. Categories of female combatants.
Category Description Proportion of combat force
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We include a number of relevant control variables reflecting group, conflict, and state-
level characteristics. First, we account for the group’s military capabilities using information
available in the NSA dataset (Cunningham et al., 2013). We expect a curvilinear relationship
between capabilities and conflict duration, with very weak and very strong groups fighting
short wars. We therefore include two dichotomous variables in the analysis to account for
relative rebel capabilities, both of which are based on the ‘‘Rebel Strength’’ variable included
in the NSA dataset. Low Capabilities is coded 1 if the group was coded as ‘‘much weaker’’
than the government in the dataset and 0 otherwise. High Capabilities is coded as 1 if the
group was coded as ‘‘stronger’’ or ‘‘much stronger’’ than the government in the dataset and
0 otherwise.
We also include binary indicators accounting for external intervention. Rebel External
Support accounts for any external support provided to the rebels by a foreign government,
including military support (weapons, etc.), non-military support (financial resources, intelli-
gence, etc.), and the provision of troops. Government External Support reflects the provision
of any of these forms of support to the incumbent.11 Previous studies have also found that
rebel groups with a legal political wing fight shorter wars (Sawyer et al., 2017; Cunningham
et al., 2009). We therefore include the binary measure Legal Political Wing. As we noted
above, rebel access to foreign sanctuaries creates uncertainty and shelters rebels from war
costs, therefore prolonging conflict (Salehyan, 2007). External Base is a binary variable indi-
cating that rebels stationed troops in a foreign country or had extensive access to extraterri-
torial bases. Secessionist Conflict reflects whether the central demand of the rebel groups
involved in the conflict focused on independence or autonomy from the central state. We
take these indicators from the NSA dataset.
We control for a country’s level of economic development using the variable GDPpc. This
indicator reflects the natural log of the state’s mean real per capita gross domestic product.
Population Size reflects the natural log of the population. Both estimates are taken from
Gleditsch (2002). Because our data is largely time invariant, we take the mean value of these
measures for the years of the conflict episode. The variable Democracy accounts for the pres-
ence of these institutions. We construct this indicator by computing the median value of the
Polity2 score from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2019) for the years of the conflict
episode, then assign a value of 1 to cases with median Polity2 score of 6 or greater and 0
otherwise.
The binary indicator Forced Recruitment is taken from Wood and Thomas (2017), who
adapted it from Cohen (2013). This variable indicates whether these strategies were used by
any of the rebel factions active during a given conflict episode. Finally, we include variables
representing group political ideology. In addition to influencing female recruitment, ideol-
ogy might also influence the duration of the conflict, particularly if it influences the groups’
resolve, recruitment potential, or ability to acquire external support. In order to ensure that
the prevalence of female combatants is not serving as a proxy for ideology, we therefore
include controls for Islamist and Leftist political ideologies. These binary indicators come
from Wood and Thomas (2017).
Empirical results
We report the results of our CPH models in Figure 1.12 For ease of interpretation, we report
coefficient estimates and confidence intervals in the figures. Positive values (right of the zero
line) indicate that a variable corresponds to an increase in the hazard of observing a given
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outcome while negative values (left of zero) reflect a decrease in the hazard. Model 1 reports
a base model including only a subset of group- and conflict-level indicators. Model 2 intro-
duces controls for forced recruitment and ideology. Model 3 adds state-level controls. Across
the specifications, Female Combatants is negative and achieves statistical significance. These
results imply that rebellions that include a higher proportion of female combatants survive
longer than those that exclude them or include them in smaller proportions.
These results are consistent with our central hypothesis. Armed groups that utilize female
combatants fight longer wars compared with groups that eschew women’s participation or
deploy them in only very small numbers. As we argue above, this occurs because of the
divergent beliefs that rebel and government forces hold over the effects of female comba-
tants on rebel capabilities and resolve. Because the government is uncertain about the influ-
ence of female fighters and is likely to underestimate their contributions, it will often fail to
offer the level of concessions necessary to resolve the conflict. Conversely, rebels are aware
of the contributions that female fighters make to the group’s capability; moreover, given the
costs associated with female recruitment, they understand female fighters as a reflection of
their resolve to fight despite rising costs—a signal that governments often fail to appreciate.
Figure 1. Effect of female combatants on conflict duration.
Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from Cox proportional hazard models; n = 380 (model 1), 303
(model 2), 302 (model 3); Wald x2 = 61.84 (model 1), 70.29 (model 2), 86.56 (model 3).
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Figure 2 illustrates the substantive effect of Female Combatants on conflict duration. The
graph shows the predicted effect of the variable when it is set at either 0 (‘‘None/No
Evidence’’) or 3 (High Prevalence) on the survival function for conflict termination via any
cause. The survival functions represent the proportion of groups with a given characteristic
(e.g. female combatant prevalence) that survived (y-axis) until a specified time t (x-axis). For
ease of interpretation, we display the time in years rather than days, which is the temporal
unit for the duration analysis. Consistent with our expectations, the survival function sug-
gests that armed groups that include large numbers of female combatants survive longer—
and are therefore less likely to successfully negotiate an end to the conflict—compared with
those that do not include female combatants. For example, roughly 30% of armed groups
that had no female combatants (solid line) survived at least five years; in contrast, 57% of
groups that had a high prevalence of female combatants (dashed line) survived at least 5
years. This difference persists as the hypothetical conflict time increases: conflicts involving
groups that include female combatants end at a substantial lower rate than conflicts involv-
ing comparable groups that completely excluded women from combat roles.
Robustness checks and extensions
In a series of robustness checks, we also attempt to correct for potential bias introduced by
the heterogeneity in data availability in the groups included in our sample as well as potential
endogeneity resulting from female recruitment often occurring only once a group is relatively
Figure 2. Survival functions by female combatant categories.
Panels illustrate the proportion of armed groups that survived (y-axis) to a given time point (x-axis) for the specified
values of Female Combatants. Vertical line denotes average length of conflict episodes in sample (t = 5).
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well established.13 We first address the possibility of an endogenous relationship between
female recruitment and the duration of the conflict. Owing to the gender biases of male lead-
ers, female recruitment may occur later in the rebellion’s life cycle. The timing of female
recruitment could therefore bias our results. Ideally, time-varying data on the prevalence of
female combatants would allow us to directly assess whether female recruitment varies over
time. Unfortunately, the data included in the WARD is largely time-invariant, complicating
efforts to address the possibility of reverse causality. One strategy for addressing this poten-
tial bias is to exclude cases that rapidly failed from the analysis, thus reducing the number of
groups that might have failed before they made the decision to recruit women. Even after
excluding cases that terminated within 3 years of conflict onset,14 Female Combatants
remains a significant predictor of conflict duration.15
Challenges in collecting accurate information on female combatants represent an addi-
tional potential source of bias. Female combatants may be overlooked in less visible armed
groups that receive less academic scrutiny or media coverage. Such oversights are most likely
to occur in the context of relatively weak and short-lived rebel movements because they are
also the most likely to fail early. To address this issue, we conduct an additional set of analy-
ses that exclude cases designated as ‘‘low information’’ in the WARD. This binary indicator
denotes cases where little to no information on women’s involvement could be located
despite substantial information regarding other group characteristics.16 The results are
robust to this alternative sample as well. Together, these results should help alleviate con-
cerns that endogeneity bias drives our results. We present these results in Figure 3.
Insights from the LTTE
In this section, we return to the LTTE as an illustrative example of the effects of female
recruitment on group capabilities and to highlight how the social costs that rebel groups and
individual female fighters bear for recruiting female combatants reflect their commitment
and resolve. As the case exemplifies, female combatants often play an important role in
helping the group meet its resource demands and positively contribute to its fighting capac-
ity. Moreover, it demonstrates the costs associated with this decision, which can be viewed
as indicative of group resolve and individual commitment.
Although not typically viewed as explicitly Marxist, like many leftwing movements the
LTTE espoused rhetoric in favor of expanding women’s rights (Hellmann-Rajanayagam,
1994). Likewise, women’s participation as combatants in the LTTE was not necessarily a
result of individual political commitments. While some argue that the nationalist sentiment
of the LTTE individually motivated Tamil women, others argue that nationalist goals were
a ‘‘meta-reason’’ for women’s enlistment in the movement, and that communal suffering
and oppression more directly drove women to join (Alison, 2003: 40). For example, one
female combatant from the LTTE explained that the deaths of her family members in the
early years of the war were what motivated her to enlist: ‘‘My brothers were killed, and out
of rage, I joined the movement . I wanted to die as my brothers died’’ (Alison, 2003: 40).
Other women have also cited family displacement and fears of the sexual violence perpe-
trated by the Indian Peacekeeping Force and the Sri Lankan military as their motivation for
joining the armed ranks of the LTTE (Alison, 2003).
Despite the common experiences that motivated many women to fight for the LTTE,
social expectations for Tamil women nonetheless demanded that they remain at home as
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wives and daughters and not participate as soldiers in the war. Adele Balasingham, wife of
the LTTE’s chief political advisor, described female combatants’ contributions to the group
as ‘‘ripp[ing] open the straight jacket of conservative images of [Tamil] women’’ (Stack-
O’Connor, 2007: 46). Yet, many local Tamils viewed women’s deployment in combat roles
as a ‘‘violation of Tamil traditions and a threat to the purity of the LTTE’’ (Stack-
O’Connor, 2007: 50). Thus, female combatants simultaneously faced backlash from their
local community and were told that their participation was dismantling the gender norms
fueling that backlash. Once part of the LTTE, female fighters were taught that
It is only the women with a revolutionary consciousness who could become a revolutionary force.
Only such a revolutionary force can destroy the shackles of oppression . The Tamil Eelam revolu-
tionary woman has transformed herself as a Tiger for the Liberation of our land and liberation of
women. (Alison, 2003: 45)
While political commitment to overturning traditional social structures may not be what
motivated many Tamil women to join the LTTE, once enlisted, commitment to the group’s
goals became their only option for achieving liberation from the restrictive gender norms
that threatened their ability to return to civilian society without social backlash. Interviews
Figure 3. Results from restricted samples.
Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from Cox proportional hazard models; n = 233 (model 1), 175
(model 5); Wald x2=52.37 (model 4), 90.06 (model 5).
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with female LTTE combatants reveal that their awareness and commitment to improving
life for Tamil women grew throughout their participation in the rebellion (Alison, 2003: 44).
The local Tamil community often resisted the policies and reforms from the LTTE that
directly challenged the social conservatism that many Tamils supported. Local communities
especially contested the LTTE’s agenda for women’s involvement in the movement, and con-
servative families were ‘‘displeased with the new roles their daughters would have to take
up’’ (Loken, 2021: 24; Terpstra and Frerks, 2017: 298–299). Terpstra and Frerks (2017) ulti-
mately conclude that the LTTE’s radical position on women’s inclusion in the movement,
along with other social reforms, did not help legitimize the LTTE to the surrounding com-
munity. Rather, the LTTE enhanced its legitimation through claims to common Tamil des-
cent and a Tamil nation, martyrdom, sacrifices, charismatic leadership, and its narrative of
being the ‘‘protector’’ against Sinhalese aggression (Terpstra and Frerks, 2017: 300).
As separatist conflict intensified in the late 1980s causalities mounted and the group’s
combat forces were depleted at a rapid rate. Moreover, the LTTE had also lost support
from India and faced the arrival of the Indian Peacekeeping Force, which intended to dis-
arm the group. By this point in the conflict, the LTTE had lost approximately 8% of its
membership (Stack-O’Connor, 2007: 47). Therefore, a major component of understanding
why the LTTE decided to open combat roles to women—and why in the 1980s instead of a
decade earlier—lies in the ‘‘supply and demand for fighters’’ (Stack-O’Connor, 2007: 47). To
meet these challenges, the LTTE’s leadership doubled down on recruitment efforts and
expanded the deployment of female combatants. Given the potential for backlash from the
local Tamil community discussed above, this decision should be viewed as an indication of
the group’s commitment to its political goals. In other words, the group was willing to risk
alienating substantial segments of the primary constituency it claimed to represent in order
to address the immediate human resource needs imposed by rising conflict intensity.
This decision also returned strategic dividends by growing the overall size of the group’s
combat force. The number of female recruits also increased over time, rising from some
3000 troops in 1992 to almost 5000 troops in 2001, thus representing a nearly 70% increase
in the rate of female recruitment over the decade (Gonzalez-Perez, 2008: 62). At the peak,
female fighters constituted as much as a quarter of the group’s combat force. Both in terms
of raw numbers and as a proportion of the group’s fighting force, the decision to expand
female recruitment and more fully incorporate women into its ranks resulted in a tangible
increase in the LTTE’s overall capabilities. Moreover, the LTTE leadership established the
Black Tigers—an elite suicide force—in July 1987 (Stack-O’Connor, 2007: 52). Women were
overrepresented in the Black Tigers relative to their prevalence in the rest of the LTTE
forces, ultimately forming about one-third of this brutally effective force that was responsi-
ble for hundreds of highly lethal suicide attacks over the course of the civil war (Gonzalez-
Perez, 2008: 62). Rebel leaders also recognized the potential propaganda value of female
combatants, eventually leveraging the visible presence of women in combat roles to garner
support for the group through its image as an all-encompassing social movement (Stack-
O’Connor, 2007: 48; Terpstra and Frerks, 2017: 300). Tamil propaganda featuring female
fighters ultimately helped strengthen local and diasporic support for the movement, as
women’s increased participation also incited feelings of shame in the broader Tamil commu-
nity for relying on women – who ought to be at home, not on the battlefield – to fight the
war (Hellmann-Rajanayagam, 1994).
While recruitment of female combatants expanded group capabilities and reflected the
commitment of the LTTE and its membership to achieving the group’s stated goal of Tamil
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independence, the Sri Lankan Civil War persisted after several failed negotiation attempts
between the government and the rebels (Stack-O’Connor, 2007: 45). It is perhaps unsurpris-
ing that the Sri Lankan government failed to perceive the LTTE’s increased use of female
combatants as a signal of increased rebel capacity, given that state military leaders were gen-
erally skeptical of women’s abilities to perform in combat roles (see Goldstein, 2001). The
government did not initially view the influx of female combatants to the LTTE as a threat
because, ‘‘women were assumed to be non-threatening, [due to] their inherent nature (weak
and soft) and social roles (subservient to males)’’ (Stack-O’Connor, 2007: 47). Indeed,
because the LTTE began recruiting women for combat roles in response to extreme resource
shortages, the decision to incorporate female fighters may have served as a signal to the Sri
Lankan government of the rebel group’s overall fragility. Thus, while the recruitment of
female combatants led to increased capabilities and resolve for the LTTE, these benefits
may not have been interpreted as such by the state. The strategic advantages of incorporat-
ing female combatants as well as the costs the group and its female members faced as result
of its recruitment strategies potentially remained private information held by the LTTE
leadership. The government’s inability to appreciate this information therefore impeded the
bargaining process, leading it to under estimate the group’s capabilities and resolve and thus
allowing the war to persist for decades.
Conclusion
While women’s participation in violent political organizations is well documented, scholars
have only recently begun to systematically investigate the factors that explain variations in
the presence or prevalence of female fighters (or other female members) across these groups.
With few exceptions (e.g. Braithwaite and Ruiz, 2018), cross-national evaluations have over-
looked the ways in which gendered recruitment might influence the survival of armed
groups, their effectiveness in the battlefield, or the ultimate outcome of their violent cam-
paigns. This manuscript therefore represents among the first attempts to explicitly theorize
about the potential influences of the gendered composition of armed groups on conflict
duration utilizing a large sample of diverse conflicts. The argument and the empirical evi-
dence that we muster suggest that the degree of gender diversity within an armed resistance
movement represents another important attribute that may have substantial implications for
how wars are fought and how they end.
The argument and findings we present also dovetail with existing studies that highlight the
important—but often overlooked—implications of rebel recruitment strategies (e.g. Cohen,
2013; Haer and Böhmelt, 2016; Weinstein, 2007). In particular, a growing body of evidence
suggests that how an armed group recruits as well as who it recruits may subsequently influ-
ence its behaviors during the conflict and the manner in which the conflict unfolds. Future
research may wish to further explore the extent to which rebel recruitment decisions, the spe-
cific resource mobilization strategies the group adopts, and the constituencies from which it
recruits influence the dynamics of armed conflict. Owing to the endogenous relationship
between recruitment strategies and conflict dynamics, teasing out causal relationships will
probably prove challenging; nonetheless, such relationships are undoubtedly relevant to
scholars who wish to understand patterns of wartime violence and the duration and termina-
tion of violent conflicts.
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In a related manner, one potential limit of this study is its inability to disentangle the
group’s motives for recruiting female combatants from the influence of these recruits on
conflict processes. In particular, secular armed groups—and particularly those that embrace
leftist ideologies—are the most likely to recruit female fighters. Political ideology influences
both the group’s objectives and its recruitment strategies, both of which in turn shape the
bargaining process between the rebels and the government and thus determine the duration
of the conflict. While we control for group ideology in our empirical model and find no sys-
tematic relationship between leftist ideology and conflict duration, we note that the over-
whelming majority of the illustrative examples that we use in our study, including our mini-
case study, feature armed groups that espouse some form of leftwing political ideology.17 It
is therefore possible that despite controlling for ideology, the effect of female combatants on
conflict duration is closely intertwined with the group’s ideology and may be most apparent
in the case of leftist rebellions. Future studies may wish to disentangle this relationship.
Finally, from a policy standpoint, our findings should provide outside observers with
important clues regarding the expected duration of armed conflicts. External actors should
perhaps view the presence of substantial numbers of female combatants—or the onset of
rebel efforts to mobilize women for war—as predictive of a conflict that will endure and
become increasingly difficult to successfully resolve. They may therefore wish to incorporate
this information into their mediation efforts. In particular, external actors may find it help-
ful to attempt to disabuse the incumbent of the notion that female recruitment signals rebel
weakness and adopt other strategies that can help minimize uncertainty about the meaning
and implications of female recruitment.
Most importantly, perhaps, our argument joins a large of body literature that highlights
the important roles that women play in armed rebellions. In so doing, it also recognizes
women as both perpetrators and victims of wartime violence and calls attention to the asso-
ciated need for more effective strategies to assist the reintegration of former female fighters
into post-conflict society. As we demonstrate, the wars in which female combatants partici-
pate tend to be longer and more difficult to resolve. As such, the reintegration challenges
faced by all former combatants are likely to be greatest following these conflicts. This is espe-
cially true for women, who have often transgressed cultural norms and rejected social and
familial obligations as a result of their decision to take up arms. Indeed, former female com-
batants often face the twin challenge of social stigmatization for participating in organized
violence (e.g. Freidman, 2018; Veale, 2003) and the de-emphasis of their roles as fighters in
the years following the resolution of the conflict (e.g. MacKenzie, 2009). This confluence of
processes, which (intentionally) overlooks and rewrites their contributions during wartime
and yet still punishes them, can produce devastating long-term psychological, social, and
economic costs for demobilized women. Despite the gender-specific challenges that former
female combatants face, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts have histori-
cally excluded women, especially those affiliated with rebel organizations (e.g. Henshaw,
2020; MacKenzie, 2009). Consequently, our findings provide additional urgency to efforts to
more fully appreciate and respond to the complex needs of female veterans of protracted
civil conflicts.
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Notes
1. Despite their inferior physical capabilities, a subset of rebel groups may view them as attractive
recruits because of the comparative ease with which they are indoctrinated and manipulated
(Beber and Blattman, 2013).
2. A similar logic may encourage the use of child soldiers (e.g. Lasley and Thyne, 2014). However,
compared with children adult women possess superior cognitive, emotional, and physical capabil-
ities, thus making female recruitment the comparatively more advantageous strategy for most
rebel groups seeking to bolster their capabilities (e.g. Goldstein, 2001: 159–164; Wood, 2019, 34).
While there is some evidence that child soldiers exert a weak positive effect on group fighting
capacity (Haer and Böhmelt, 2016), we demonstrate empirically in our Online Appendix that
unlike female combatants, child soldiers exert no observable influence on the duration of the
conflict.
3. Systematic data collection efforts indicate that female combatants are present in roughly a third of
rebel movements; however, even among groups that utilize female fighters, women typically repre-
sent only a small minority of the overall combat force (see Henshaw, 2016; Thomas and Bond,
2015; Wood and Thomas, 2017).
4. Based on data in the WARD (Wood and Thomas, 2017).
5. Viterna (2013), for example, differentiates among ‘‘reluctant’’, ‘‘recruited,’’ and ‘‘politicized’’ com-
batants. Our argument pertains to the latter two categories but not the former.
6. While even the most gender inclusive movements typically fail to deliver on their promises of
women’s rights and equality, their failures in these areas only become apparent after the war ends
(and they achieve victory). To the extent women believe that the groups for which they fight will
disrupt the pre-war status quo, they should also believe that rebel victory will ameliorate the social
sanctions that they face after the war ends.
7. We exclude coups from our analysis because they are not included in WARD.
8. Plotting the Schoenfeld residuals reveals no violation of the proportional hazard assumption.
9. We adopt a two-year (730 day) window to account for recurrent dyads within the dataset.
10. We rely on the WARD measure that reflects the conservative ‘‘Best’’ estimate. However, the
results are very similar if we use the alternative WARD measure that excludes suicide bombers or
the less conservative ‘‘High’’ estimate.
11. We use the indicator ‘‘explicit support’’, but results are similar when substituting the ‘‘alleged’’
support indicator.
12. All models include robust standard errors clustered on the dyad.
13. We present additional robustness checks in our online appendix.
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14. Onset represents the first date the group exceeded 25 battle-related deaths according to the UCDP
Dyadic Dataset.
15. Repeating the analysis on a sample excluding all cases that survived fewer than 5 years produces
very similar results.
16. WARD (v1.3) codebook. Available from: https://reedmwood.com/home-page/women-in-armed-
rebellion-dataset-ward/
17. We note, however, that there is debate about the extent to which the leadership of ZANU-PF and
the LTTE, two cases that we reference above, were committed to socialist or communist princi-
ples, and nationalist ideologies appear to dominate the rhetoric and beliefs of these organizations.
Nonetheless, both espoused broadly leftwing political agendas.
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